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NOTES
CONFLICTING STATE CLAIMS UNDER
MODERN ESCHEAT STATUTES
Pennsylvania instituted proceedings in a Pennsylvania trial court
to escheat certain unclaimed money orders held by the Western
Union Telegraph Company, a New York corporation with its prin-
cipal place of business in New York. The senders had purchased the
money orders in Pennsylvania to be delivered chiefly to out-of-state
payees. When the senders (who were entitled to the funds when the
payees failed to claim them) could not be located for over seven
years, Pennsylvania sought possession under the applicable Pennsyl-
vania escheat statute.' The company pleaded in defense that since
the same property was subject to escheat in New York and since
the Pennsylvania judgment would not prevent a second escheat
there, the trial court should dismiss the proceeding to avoid a taking
of property without due process of law. The Pennsylvania Supreme
Court, in affirming the trial court judgment escheating the property,
held that New York would be unable to escheat the same property
because New York would be bound by the Pennsylvania judgment
by virtue of the full faith and credit clause of the United States
Constitution.! On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, New
York appeared as an amicus curiae in support of Western Union's
position. Held, reversed: A state court judgment taking property
which is subject to escheat in other states violates due process: the
state courts have no power to protect the holder from claims of other
states, because a state court judgment need not be given full faith
and credit by other states as to parties not subject to the jurisdiction
of the rendering court. Western Union Tel. Co. v. Pennsylvania,
368 U.S. 71 (1961).a
In recent years many states have enacted statutes4 implementing
' Pa. Star. Ann. tit. 27, §§ 333 (1958).
2 Pennsylvania v. Western Union Tel. Co., 400 Pa. 337, 162 A.2d 617, 622-23 (1960).
Because Pennsylvania felt bound by the doctrine of full faith and credit, the trial court
dismissed the action against those money orders which had already been claimed by New
York, even though Pennsylvania did "not recognize New York's authority to escheat" them.
73 Dauphin Co. Rep. 160, 173 (Pa. 1960).
' The Court remarked that in order to settle controversies which may arise between
states as to which is entitled to the same property, a suit may be filed in the Supreme Court
of the United States. 368 U.S. at 80. See text accompanying notes 56-59 infra for a discus-
sion of such a suit.
' The following states have adopted the Uniform Disposition of Unclaimed Property
Act (hereafter referred to as the "Uniform Act") : Arizona: Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§
44-351 to -378 (1956); California: Cal. Ann. Code Civ. Proc. §§ 1500-27 (1959);
Idaho: Idaho Code Ann. §§ 14-501 to -530 (1961); Illinois: Ill. Ann. Star. ch. 141,
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older escheat acts (or constitutional provisions) in order to pro-
vide a means whereby certain personal property (including in-
tangibles) can be turned over to the state by the holders of such
property.' Under the older statutes, if the titleholder died, or if he
was presumed dead by virtue of his absence during a specified num-
ber of years, the state was empowered to obtain possession by peti-
tioning a designated trial court.! Following the issuance of personal
service on known interested persons and publication of notice gen-
erally, the property was escheated if neither the last owner (if alive)
nor his heirs, devisees, or legatees successfully proved a right to the
property. Without enlarging the scope of property subject to escheat,
the modern statutes greatly increase the effectiveness of the older
acts by requiring holders of specified escheatable property to report
§ 101-30 (Smith-Hurd 1961); New Mexico: N.M. Star. Ann. § 22-22-1 to -29 (1959);
Oregon: Ore. Rev. Sat. § 98.302-.436 (1957); Utah: Utah Code Ann. §5 78-44-1 to -28
(1957); Virginia: Va. Code Ann. §§ 55-210.1-.30 (1960); Washington: Wash. Rev. Code
§§ 63.28.070-.920 (195$).
Other states which have enacted modern statutes include: Alaska: Alaska Comp. Laws
Ann. 5 57-8-8 (Supp. 1958); Arkansas: Ark. Stat. Ann. §§ 50-601 to -612 (Supp. 1961);
Connecticut: Conn. Gen. Stat. Rev. §§ 3-56a to -75a (1962); Delaware: Del. Code Ann.
tit. 11, §§ 1130-94 (Supp. 1960); Hawaii: Hawaii Rev. Laws §§ 235-1 to -31 (1955);
Kentucky: Ky. Rev. Stat. §§ 393.010-990 (1960); Massachusetts: Mass. Ann. Laws ch.
200A, § 1-17 (1961); Michigan: Mich. Stat. Ann. §§ 26.1053-.1054 (Supp. 1961);
Minnesota: Minn. Star. Ann. §§ 48.521-.528 (Supp. 1961) (bank deposits); Montana:
Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. §§ 91-501 to -526 (Supp. 1961); Nevada: Nev. Rev. Stat. §
154.010-.190 (1959); New Jersey: N.J. Stat. Ann. §5 2A:37-1 to -44 (1952); New York:
N.Y. Aband. Prop. Law § 1-1501 (Supp. 1962); North Carolina: N.C. Gen. Stat. 55
116-20 to -26 (1958); North Dakota: N.D. Cent. Code 55 30-25-01 to -07, 54-01-01 to
-02.3, 56-01-14 (1960), 6-08-24.1 (Supp. 1961) (bank deposits); Ohio: Ohio Rev. Code
Ann. § 2105.07-.09 (Page 1954), 109.41 (Page 1962); Oregon: Ore. Rev. Seat. 55
120.010-.400 (1961); Pennsylvania: Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 27, 55 1-497 (Supp. 1962);
Rhode Island: R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. § 33-21-1 to -43 (Supp. 1962); South Carolina: S.C.
Code § 57-201 to -245.1 (Supp. 1960); Tennessee: Tenn. Code Ann. § 31-801 to -829
(1955); § 56-238 to -249 (Supp. 1962) (unclaimed life insurance funds); Texas: Tex.
Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. arts. 3272, 3272a, 3272b (Supp. 1962) (see notes 16-22 injra and
accompanying text); Vermont: Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 14, §§ 681-84 (Supp. 1961), tit. 27, §§
1201-07 (1959); Wisconsin: Wis. Star. Ann. §§ 318.03, 186.29 (Supp. 1962) (credit union
unclaimed funds), 220.25 (1957) (bank deposits); Wyoming: Wyo. Star. Ann. § 9-687,
-688 (Supp. 1961).
5Some statutes provide that property will "escheat," i.e., title will vest in the state;
whereas, others provide that the state will become a "custodian" of the property, i.e., a
"conservatory fund" is established by the state for the benefit of lawfully-entitled owners.
The difference is usually academic, since in most instances the owner can obtain his
property by filing a claim with the state even though the property has technically escheated.
Also, in both instances the relinquishing holder is protected from subsequent claims made
by the entitled owner either by the escheat judgment (see Hamilton v. Brown, 161 U.S.
256 (1896); Wiederanders v. State, 64 Tex. 133 (1885)) or by a reimbursement provision
(in custodian cases). See discussion of one reimbursement provision in note 15 infra. In
any event, the matter of prime import in the instant case does not concern protection of
the holder from subsequent claims by the owner but rather from escheat claims by other
states. For purposes of this Note, the term "escheat" will be employed to include "custody"
provisions unless otherwise indicated.
'See, e.g., N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:37-1 (1952); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 27, § 42 (1958); Tex.
Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 3273 (Supp. 1962).
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to the state when the property has become ripe for escheat, i.e., when
it is presumed abandoned because the owner has not been located
for a specified period. Thus, by placing the burden of reporting on
the holders of large amounts of property subject to escheat, the state
becomes apprised of the status of the property and its whereabouts
and can take possession.
Exemplifying the modern statutes is the Uniform Disposition of
Unclaimed Property Act,7 which has been recommended for adop-
tion since 1955. The scope of the property and holders reached by
such modern acts is indicated by reference to sections 2 through 9
of the Uniform Act. Section 2 provides for the reporting of dor-
mant, inactive, and unclaimed accounts, dividends, checks, and
other funds held by banking or financial organizations. The re-
maining sections apply to (a) unclaimed funds held by life in-
surance companies,s (b) deposits and refunds held by utilities,' (c)
undistributed dividends and distributions of business associations,"
(d) property held in the course of dissolution by business associations
and banking or financial organizations," (e) property held by
fiduciaries,1 and (f) property held by state courts and public of-
ficers.1 Section 9 is an omnibus provision covering all intangible
personal property not otherwise reached by the more specific pro-
visions in the act; however, it applies only to holders who have ob-
tained the property in the ordinary course of their business. Each of
these sections presumes that the property is abandoned after seven
years if (1) not claimed, or (2) the owner is not located, or (3) it
remains inactive. Once property becomes legally abandoned, the
holder is required to report that fact,' and the property is ultimately
deposited with the state treasurer as conservator."
The Texas provisions are analogous in substance to the Uniform
Act but are different in form.' In addition to the older Texas escheat
statute, article 3272,"7 the Legislature has recently enacted two sup-
7 The act is designed as a complete integration of all escheat provisions of a state.
'Uniform Act 5 3.
' Uniform Act 5 4.
" Uniform Act' § 5.
1 Uniform Act S 6.
1 Uniform Act 5 7.
"Uniform Act 5 8.
'4 Uniform Act 5 11.
'5 Uniform Act § 13. The provision for notice and publication of lists of property pre-
sumed abandoned is found in § 12. Section 14 declares that holders are relieved from liability
to subsequent claimants after relinquishing the property to the state treasurer. However,
if the holder prefers to pay the claimant directly, it will be reimbursed by the state
treasurer "upon proof of such payment and proof that the payee was entitled thereto .. "
16 See Braswell, Texas' New Abandoned Prokerly Statutes, 25 Tex. B.J. 767 (1962).
" Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. (1925). The present form was passed in 1885. For an
excellent discussion of the earlier statutory history in Texas, see Hamilton v. Brown, 161
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plementary statutes, articles 3272a"s and 3272b."' The thrust of these
acts, as indicated by the three basic requisites, is that (1) only
certain "personal property" (2) held by specified "holders" (3) in
designated geographical locations is escheatable. Article 3272a is a
general, all-inclusive statute which is as wide in scope as the en-
tire Uniform Act except that it excludes the dormant bank ac-
count provisions (found in article 3272b). Reference to section 1 (b)
of article 3272a reveals that the term "personal property" includes,
"but is not limited to," the following:
money, stocks, bonds and other securities, bills of exchange, claims for
money or indebtedness and other written evidences of indebtedness,
dividends, deposits, accrued interest, purchase payments, sums payable
on certified checks, certificates of membership in a corporation or asso-
ciation, amounts due and payable under the terms of any insurance
policy, security deposits, unclaimed refunds and deposits for utility
or other services, funds to redeem stocks and bonds, undistributed
profits, dividends, or other interests, production and proceeds from oil,
gas and other mineral estates, and all other personal property and in-
crements thereto, whether tangible or intangible ...
Section 1 (a) provides that the following "persons" are holders:
any individual, corporation, business association, partnership, govern-
mental or political subdivision or officer, public authority, estate, trust,
trustee, officer of a court, liquidator, two (2) or more persons having
a joint or common interest, or any other legal, commercial, govern-
mental or political entity, except banks, savings and loan associations,
banking organizations or institutions ...
Under the dormant bank account provision, banking institutions
(as holders) are required to report the existence of "dormant de-
posits" and "inactive accounts," which include:
those demand, savings, or other deposits of money or its equivalent in
banking practice, including but not limited to sums due on certified
checks, dividends, notes, accrued interest, or other evidences of in-
debtedness, held by a depository for repayment to the depositor or
creditor, or his order, which . . . have continuously remained inactive
for a period of more than one (1) year without credit or debit what-
soever through the act of the depositor, either in person or through
an authorized agent other than the depository itself ...
U.S. 256 (1896). Title 53, comprising the entire body of Texas escheat enactments, was
passed pursuant to article 13, § 1 and article 5, § 8 of the Texas Constitution.
"s Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. (Supp. 1962). This statute became effective November 6,
1961.
19 Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. (Supp. 1962). This statute became effective May 1, 1962.
Note that whereas the entire Uniform Act is of the "custodian" variety, the dormant bank
account provision (article 3272b) is the only statute of this type in Texas. Both the older




Both of the Texas provisions, rather than assuming that property
is abandoned, presume that the owner "died intestate and without
heirs":2° (1) in the case of a dormant bank account, which has been
inactive for seven years, and the "existence and whereabouts ... [of
the depositor remains] unknown to the depository after advertising
therefor . . . . and (2) in the case of other personalty subject to
escheat, where "the existence and whereabouts of the owner are
unknown and have been unknown to the holder for more than seven
(7) years," where no acts of ownership have been asserted during
those years, and where "no will of the last known owner has been
recorded or probated in the county where the property is situated"
during the previous seven years.2
The conflict of laws problem posed by the principal case arises
by virtue of the third requisite of the escheat statutes, i.e., that the
state have territorial jurisdiction. Generally, all property (1) "held
within [the] State . . . or (2) held "in other states for residents
last known to have resided in this State . . ."" is subject to the opera-
tion of the statute. It is readily apparent that such a broad approach
will engender conflicts between states. In the case of (1) above,
since the property dealt with is chiefly intangible, several possible
theories may be propounded as to the situs of the same property."
In the case of (2) above, regardless of the location of the property,
conflicts will arise between the state (or states) claiming the property
by virtue of its location within that state's borders and the state
claiming by virtue of the last known residence of the owner.0 Several
earlier United States Supreme Court cases generated conflict by
2'0 This presumption is in accordance with the language of the older statute, Tex. Rev.
Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 3272 (1925).
2' Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 3272b, § 7 (Supp. 1962).
22 Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 3272a, § 1(c) (Supp. 1962).
"' Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 3272a, § 1 (b) (Supp. 1962); see also Tex. Rev. Civ.Stat. Ann. art. 3272b, 5 1(a) (Supp. 1962); Uniform Act 55 2-13.
24 Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 3272b, § 1 (b) (Supp. 1962); see also Tex. Rev. Civ.
Stat. Ann. art. 3272a, § 1 (b) (Supp. 1962); Uniform Act § 2-13.
25 For example, where money orders are involved, any one of the following states may
claim situs of the funds: (1) "[T]he State of residence of the payee, [2] the State of the
sender, [3] the State where the money order was delivered, and [4] the State where the
fiscal agent on which the money order was drawn is located ... " Pennsylvania v. Western
Union Tel. Co., 368 U.S. 71, 76 (1961). Also, in the case of undistributed dividends of
business associations, the incorporating state's escheat statute could conflict with that of
the state in which the corporation maintains its principal place of business. That the area
of law concerning the situs of intangible property is confused and unsettled is attested to
by the conflicting holdings collated and discussed in Annot., 50 A.L.R.2d 1375 (1956). See
also text accompanying notes 27-38 infra.
" Of course, it is possible that more than one state could claim that the owner's last
residence was within their borders. Presumedly, however, the holder's records will establish




holding that more than one state has the legislative power to escheat
the same property and by not considering the problem of double
escheat. In Security Say. Bank v. California," the Court held that the
liability represented by unclaimed deposits in a state bank (doing
business in California) was intangible property within California
and, therefore, that the state had sufficient jurisdiction to escheat
such property." In United States v. Klein,"' the Court held that
Pennsylvania could escheat moneys that were first deposited in the
registry of a federal district court and later turned over to the
Treasury of the United States. The Court for the first time con-
sidered the possibility of a double escheat but found that no con-
troversy existed with another state or with the federal government."
The holdings in the next two cases to come before the Court
dramatically indicate the real conflict between two or more states
when each has a valid escheat claim over the same property. In one
case, 81 the state in which the entitled owner was last known to
reside was allowed to escheat property despite the fact that the cor-
poration holding the property was domiciled elsewhere; in the second
case, 2 the state was permitted to escheat property held by a domiciliary
corporation for owners whose last known residences were in other
states.
The first case, Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Moore," involved
the New York escheat statute covering insurance policies. The Court
held that New York could assert the right to custody of the pro-
ceeds from policies issued for delivery in New York on lives of New
27263 U.S. 282 (1923).
" The basis of the holding was the location of the bank and deposit. The possibility of
a second escheat by the state in which the depositor last resided was not presented because
"the last known residence of the depositor [was] not stated." Id. at 284. In Anderson Nat'l
Bank v. Luckett, 321 U.S. 233, 241 (1943), the power to escheat dormant bank accounts
from national banks was upheld since "the deposits are debtor obligations of the bank, in-
curred and to be performed in the state where the bank is located, and hence are subject
to the state's dominion." Since bank deposits are "part of the mass of property within the
state whose transfer and devolution is subject to state control," the state can require banks
to file reports of inactive accounts as an incidence of the power to obtain surrender of
the funds. Id. at 248.
29303 U.S. 276 (1938).
'
9 Id. at 282-83:
Since the Government [of the United States] has not set up and does not
assert any claim or interest in the fund apart from the possession acquired
under the decree of the district court and the statutes of the United States,
it is unnecessary to consider now the effect on the decree of the state court
of the fund's absence from the state, and the absence or nonresidence of the
unknown claimants, if such is the case. All such questions will be open and
may be raised and decided whenever application is made to the district court
for payment of the fund.
91Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Moore, 333 U.S. 541 (1948).
"Standard Oil Co. v. New Jersey, 341 U.S. 428 (1951).
"333 U.S. 541 (1948).
1962]
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York residents, even though the insurance company was incorporated
in Massachusetts, as long as it did not affirmatively appear that the
beneficiaries had ceased to be residents of New York. In rejecting the
company's claim that only the state of incorporation had jurisdic-
tion to escheat, the Court stated:
The problem of what another state than New York may do is not be-
fore us. That question is not passed upon .... The question is whether
the State of New York has sufficient contacts with the transactions
here in question to justify the exertion of the power to seize abandoned
moneys due to its residents ... "
In the second case, Standard Oil Co. v. New Jersey,"3 the last escheat
case to be considered before the instant one, New Jersey claimed
shares of stock and unpaid dividends held by a domiciliary corpora-
tion for owners whose whereabouts were unknown. In a five-to-four
decision, the majority held that New Jersey's control over the debtor
corporation gave it power to seize the debts irrespective of the resi-
dence of the owner and regardless of where the stock was issued and
the dividends held. Justices Frankfurter and Jackson dissented on
the ground that New Jersey lacked power to escheat the property
involved as against the last known owners who were domiciled out-
side New Jersey. To the company's claim that it might be subject
to double escheat, the majority replied that the notice to the share-
holders required by the statute was adequate to support a valid
judgment against their rights. It continued:
The res is the debt and the same rule applies as with tangible property."
The debts or demands represented by the stock and dividends having
been taken from the appellant company by a valid judgment of New
Jersey, the same debts or demands against appellant cannot be taken by
another state. The Full Faith and Credit Clause bars any such double
escheat. ... "
However, at this point, the Court added:
Dissents suggest that states may enact only custodial statutes until this
Court settles any controversy that may arise between states over rights
to abandoned choses in action. The details of the method of bringing
other states and foreign countries before this Court for selection of the
appropriate sovereignty to receive the abandoned property are not
elaborated upon. The claim of no other state to this property is before
us and, of course, determination of any right of a claimant state against
4 1d. at 548.
33341 U.S. 428 (1951).
36 Id. at 443. The Court cited the following cases: Pennington v. Fourth Nat'l Bank,






New Jersey for the property escheated by New Jersey must await pre-
sentation here.as (Emphasis added.)
It appears from these cases that the legislative power to escheat
intangibles may be based upon either the fact that the property is
located in a state or that the holder is domiciled or doing business
there. The Court at this point did not definitely indicate which
criterion would be used to resolve the conflict between two claiming
states, although a dissent suggested that the last known residence of
the owner should be the test."
The Uniform Act40 contains a reciprocity provision which employs
the test of "last known residence" to resolve conflicting state escheat
claims.4" The reciprocity section provides that whenever escheatable
property is held by one who is subject to the jurisdiction of the en-
acting state and another state and who holds for a person whose last
known residence is in that other state, the property will not be pre-
sumed abandoned in the enacting state: (1) if it may be claimed
under the laws of the other state and (2) if the other state has a
similar reciprocal provision. Obviously, the section does not prevent
potential state conflicts in those cases where one of the states has
no reciprocity section. The Texas provision"' is even less effective
because it provides not that the property must be susceptible to
escheat in the other state, but rather that the property must have
been escheated by such state.
The principal case arose because the Pennsylvania escheat statute"'
30 Ibid.
" See Standard Oil Co. v. New Jersey, 341 U.S. 428, 443-45 (1951). However, see
Mr. Justice Stewart's concurring opinion in the principal case, 368 U.S. at 80: "I think
only New York [as the domicile of the holder, Western Union] has power to escheat the
property involved in this case."
40 Uniform Act § 10.
41 For an analogy in the area of decedents' estates, see Texas v. Florida, 306 U.S. 398
(1939).
42Tex. Rev. Civ. Star. Ann. art. 3272a, § 10 (Supp. 1962). Article 3272b is served by
the provisions of article 3272a. See art. 3272b, § 7: "[T]he provisions of . . . Article 3272b
are in addition and supplementary to and shall not be construed to repeal, alter, change, or
amend any of the provisions of Article 3272a to 3289, inclusive, Title 53 .. "
43Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 3272a, § 10(a) (Supp. 1962), provides that the
property will be presumed abandoned in Texas if "it has been claimed . . . under the laws
of the other State .. " (Emphasis added.) The Uniform Act states merely that the
reciprocity section (§ 10) will operate where the property "may be claimed." (Emphasis
added.) The reason for the change in language made by the Texas Legislature is unknown.
In contrast to the more restrictive Texas provision, Idaho, which has adopted the Uniform
Act, has a reciprocity section that is broader than that of the Uniform Act. See Idaho Code
Ann. §§ 14-501 to -530 (1961). Idaho's reciprocity section (Idaho Code Ann. § 14-510)
adds the following to § 10 of the Uniform Act: "Provided however that payment or de-
livery in good faith, by the holder, to another state, in accordance with its laws, shall re-
lieve the holder from liability to the State of Idaho." Therefore, even though the competing
state has no reciprocity section, Idaho will not escheat property which has already been
taken elsewhere.
44Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 27, 5§ 1-497 (Supp. 1962).
1962]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
lacked a reciprocity provision. Western Union complained, in de-
fense to Pennsylvania's escheat claim against certain of the money
orders, that New York, inter alia, had claimed the same funds. The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court45 (affirming the trial court") held that
although the competing state claims existed, by virtue of the full
faith and credit clause of the United States Constitution the
Pennsylvania judgment would prevent New York, or any other
state, from escheating the same property. The Pennsylvania court
cited for authority the language from the Standard Oil Co. case
quoted above. In reversing, the United States Supreme Court dis-
tinguished Standard Oil Co. on the ground that such language was
dictum,8 since in that case no other state was actively claiming the
property in controversy. However, in the instant case, the escheat
claims of New York, a sister state, were "particularly aggressive,
not merely potential, but actual, active and persistent. . . ." The
Court said, "There is in reality a controversy between States, pos-
sibly many of them, over the right to escheat part or all of these
funds."5 Thus, when squarely faced for the first time with the
issue of whether or not the full faith and credit doctrine applies to
protect a holder from a second escheat, the Court answered in the
negative. The reason given was that "a state court judgment need
not be given full faith and credit by other States as to parties or
property not subject to the jurisdiction of the court that rendered
it. . . ."" Moreover, another state cannot be made a party to a state
court proceeding because of article III, section 2 of the United States
Constitution which gives exclusive original jurisdiction to the United
States Supreme Court "in all cases . . . in which a State shall be [a]
Party." Therefore, the Court concluded that the escheat proceeding
instituted by Pennsylvania, the first claiming state, should have been
dismissed in order to avoid a taking of property without due process
of law-a result which evidently would follow whenever two differ-
ent states required a holder to relinquish possession to the same
property.
The prerequisite of a "particularly aggressive . . . actual, active
and persistent" claim by a state is necessary only for determining
whether the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to decide the applicability
"' Pennsylvania v. Western Union Tel. Co., 400 Pa. 337, 162 A.2d 617 (1960).
" 73 Dauphin Co. Rep. 160 (Pa. 1960).
47 See note 2 supra.
48 Standard Oil Co. v. New Jersey, 341 U.S. 428, 433 (1951). In substantiation of its
finding of dictum, the Court in the principal case (368 U.S. at 76) quoted the portion of
the Standard Oil Co. opinion set out in italics in the text accompanying note 38 supra.
49 368 U.S. at 76.
50 Ibid.
11 Id. at 75.
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NOTES
of the full faith and credit clause. The phrase serves to distinguish
the Standard Oil Co. case. It may be argued 2 that this court-
promulgated test should be applied by a state trial court to dismiss
an escheat claim of one state only if the defending holder successfully
demonstrates that another state has an "active and persistent" claim.
However, a close reading of the principal case reveals the incorrect-
ness of this latter interpretation. The more precise meaning of the
case is that whenever the holder merely demonstrates, in defense to
an escheat proceeding by one state, that another state has a statute
which, under the holdings of the Supreme Court,53 constitutionally
subjects the same property to the possibility of escheat by that other
state, the trial court should dismiss the first proceeding. The Court
significantly refused even in the instant case to announce a prin-
ciple which will serve as an answer to the controversy between two
escheating states, saving that issue for a proper case. The principal
case was not considered appropriate because New York was not
a party in the Supreme Court, even though it did appear as an amicus
curiae in support of Western Union's position."
It is apparently now the law that if a plaintiff-state be thwarted
in its escheat claim because the defendant-holder demonstrates that
another state's statute subjects the same property to escheat, the
plaintiff-state can institute an action in the Supreme Court against
the other state or states so that the Court can determine which state
is properly entitled to escheat the property claimed by both. The
Court announces in the principal case that it is the proper forum
for such a suit."
In response to this invitation, Texas has recently filed an original
S2See 39 U. Det. L.J. 431, 437 (1962).
"Cf. Security Say. Bank v. California, 263 U.S. 282 (1923); United States v. Klein,
303 U.S. 276 (1938); Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Moore, 333 U.S. 541 (1948);
Standard Oil Co. v. New Jersey, 341 U.S. 428 (1951), discussed in the above order in
notes 27-38 supra and accompanying text.
54368 U.S. at 80:
Nor need we, at this time, attempt to decide the difficult legal questions pre-
sented when many different States claim power to escheat intangibles in-
volved in transactions taking place in part in many States. It will be time
enough to consider those complicated problems when all interested states-
along with all other claimants-can be afforded a full hearing and a final,
authoritative determination. ...
55 Id. at 79:
[Ilt [is] imperative that controversies between different States over their
right to escheat intangibles be settled in a forum where all the States that
want to do so can present their claims for consideration and final, authoritative
determination. Our Court has jurisdiction to do that. Whether and under what
circumstances we will exercise our jurisdiction to hear and decide these con-
troversies ourselves in particular cases, and whether we might under some




complaint in the Supreme Court against New Jersey and Pennsyl-
vania." The action involves 37,853.53 dollars in debts owing to ap-
proximately 1800 individuals whose identities and whereabouts are
unknown by the Sun Oil Company for wages, services, supplies,
rental and royalty payments, mineral proceeds, and cash dividends.
The Texas claim is based upon the fact that the debts arose in Texas
and that the obligees' last known residences and domiciles were in
Texas. New Jersey, relying upon the fact that Sun Oil is chartered
by her, has commenced escheat proceedings in New Jersey courts
for the same funds. Pennsylvania is the state where the company's
principal office is located. Hence the Court will be faced, assuming
it accepts jurisdiction, with a conflict among the state where the
holder is domiciled, the state where the central office is maintained,
and the state which claims to be the last known residence of the
titleholders of the debts subject to escheat. Of course, it is the de-
termination of the conflict, and "the establishment of definite and
authoritative standards by which the states can be governed in
asserting their escheat powers"'" which is most desired from the
Court. However, if one were to predict an outcome of the litiga-
tion, the Texas claim based on the last known residence of the title-
holders appears to be the most popular and acceptable approach.
This is the test applied by the reciprocity sections of the Uniform
Act and the statutes of Texas and other states." Such a standard
would be operative in the case of all types of funds and holders.
It does not favor those few states which charter a great number of
corporations by virtue of their liberal corporation laws. Moreover,
this test best satisfies the policy which underlies the designation
of the situs of intangibles-which policy was enunciated by Justice
Cardoza as follows: "At the root of the selection is generally a com-
mon sense appraisal of the requirements of justice and convenience
in particular conditions."59 Until the Court finally states the sug-
gested test or another that can be used to settle conflicts among states
which claim jurisdiction to escheat the same intangible property,
the only other panacea is for every state to enact a reciprocity section
similar to section 10 of the Uniform Act.
Byron L. Falk
56 Texas v. New Jersey, Orig. Docket No. 13, 31 U.S.L. Week 3004 (U.S. July 3, 1962).
The complaint was filed in the October 1961 Term. The Court has not acted to date. See
Braswell, Texas' New Abandoned Property Statutes, 25 Tex. B.J. 767, 838 (1962).
" Brief for Plaintiff, p. 22, Texas v. New Jersey, supra note 56 (in support of motion
for leave to file bill of complaint).
56 See notes 40-43 supra and accompanying text; see also text accompanying note 39
supra.
" Severnoe Sec. Corp. v. London & Lancashire Ins. Co., 255 N.Y. 120, 123-24, 174 N.E.
299, 300 (1931).
[Vol. 16
